EFFECTIVE INNOVATION THROUGH MILITARY INSTITUTIONALIZATION

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Abstract: This paper will focus on the elements of military organizations, whether how to innovate effectively in the realm of the twenty-first century' fast-changing rhythm. The emerging new world order changes the nature and scope of the interaction of components and the whole in determining the development of military culture, the degree of the value of the impact of individual elements, on the one hand, and system-wide processes on the other, on its (military culture) evolution. The paper aims to provide a conceptual, theoretical framework to an institutional culture where it is an essential element to innovate successfully, and that enables interpretation of strategic assessments to military capabilities. In the meantime, strategic assessment requires the involvement of political and military leadership styles, strategies, and techniques to calculate the strategic factors with close harmonization. Military organizations could be adaptive when they embrace practical lessons learned system: with one crucial component having personnel with a mindset of Mission Command Philosophy; significantly with a flexible doctrine that fosters and promotes it. Not always, the best and smart groundbreaking ideas come true in real life. Enlightened military intellectuals are the ones who make their ideas go through and understand the military as a continuation of policy-making. The foundation for such military intellectualism must take its roots from history based military theory.

Keywords: culture, war, mission, military, innovation, force, state.

1. INTRODUCTION

The newest phase of development of the Worlds' society is portrayed by disunity, social stratification, conflict, uncertainty, and inconsistency. The complex tasks of transforming society require the search for credible mechanisms for managing social processes, improving institutions that can mitigate the strictness of social tension. The transitory essence of society necessitates a rethinking of the social interaction, the success of which is primarily due to the change of linear, waiting for influence on the interactive arrangement of the interests of the

subjects, principles of dialogue, transparency, understanding, and trust. Eliminating the alienation of subjects from each other through manageable intermediaries' patterns of synergy actualizes the exploration for new advances and attitudes on communication activities, including military interactions with the public notice, which in society play a unique integrating role.

The transitional phase of each society is delineated by a reassessment of the classical management paradigm, the search for new paths, and the revision of the existing critical provisions of rational management, which is still based on the traditional principles of direct object influence.

Therefore, the search for adaptive control methods in these conditions with innovations (lat. "innovatio" - "update," "improvement"), which ensures the effectiveness of the functioning of subjects of political and socio-economic activities, efficient resource management, positive changes in relevant social institutions and objects of military leadership contingencies in pursuit of excellence.

In November 1917, at the battle of Cambrai, the British Army partially demonstrated Blitzkrieg tactics by employing tanks in warfare. Although British military historians Fuller and Hart forecasted promising future of armored warfare, it was German Army that implemented the Blitzkrieg successfully in 1940, which achieved most decisive victory in the operational war in military history (Barry and Williamson, 2007, p. 378). By the end of WWI, Britain with twelve-aircraft carriers had the best naval aviation, but at the beginning of WWII, the US had the strongest aircraft carrier fleet, and closest follower was Japan. What reasons were behind the success of Germany and the US? The stance of this paper is to assume that military organization must have an institutional culture, effective lessons learned system, meritorious, experienced, and idealistic individuals that set the conditions to innovate effectively. The central concern of this work will focus on the use of historical examples to support the argument. This article contributes an introductory and comprehensive summary of these phenomena, using a series of case studies to illustrate how organizational and military culture shaped the understanding of security threats, perceptions of warfare, and intuitive replies to security challenges; simply put how this culture formed military knowledge and behavior.

2.THE *CULTURE* AS A TOOL FOR PROFESSIONALISM

Cultures define specific patterns of actions as 'good,' 'useful' and 'practical,' turn those definitions

into undeniable truths, and often set practices – military methods as well – in stone, even if new realities prove them old-fashioned. Studying at organizations instead of societies as units of analysis, organizational culture can explain organizational behavior, beliefs, and hidden assumptions. Military organizations present a particularly clear case of a cultural organization. Military culture influences military performance by undeviatingly affecting soldiers' understandings of operations' context, most distinctly in the way they perceive their enemy, the nature of the mission, standards of proper behavior, and threat levels. When soldiers deploy in operation, their military culture, with its preexisting beliefs, norms, attitudes, and values, accompanies them and profoundly forms their interpretation of the surrounding circumstances, decreases the range of actions they will consider convenient and viable, and thus affects their ultimate behavior (Ruffa, 2017, p. 394).

Armies are profoundly systemized, formed, declaratively patterned organizations. They rigorously regulate activities through official doctrines that reflect and reproduce their 'obvious' intrinsic cultural truths and derive actions from those truths (Vardi, 2008, p. 296). Institutional culture plays a crucial role in how armed forces prepare themselves for future war.

From this point of view, it signifies an essential element in successful innovation. Based on the research of the interwar period, military forces that innovated successfully were the ones who could interpret strategic calculations to military capabilities and had a practical lesson learned system. In 2017, Griffin (p. 203) published a paper in which he described that given its contemporary predominance, one would assume the 'Cultural School' to have articulated some convincing disputes for the primacy of strategic and organizational culture not just in shaping innovation but in describing the very terms in which militaries recognize the changing character of the conflict itself. Indeed, some of the mightiest proponents of the impact of culture illustrate how culture exerts that influence each of the elements of fighting power: moral, physical and conceptual.

Military institutions must have the ability to conduct strategic assessments to get ready for future wars. As Vardi (2008, p. 297) points out failure to adjust to new trends might render the whole structure obsolete; prosperous military institutions are therefore ones that handle to adapt their organizational culture, and hence their manners, usefully to new realities. Accordingly, the components of strategic assessments include; anticipation of the enemy, operational theatre,

the proximity in distance and time from the possible outbreak of war, the balance between deterring war or simply preparing to fight it, the likely length of a potential conflict, the role of allies, and the "lessons of the latest war" (Allan, 2007, p. 336). Bearing in mind that a successful outcome of the future wars depends on how well military organizations in coordination with political leadership calculates strategic factors given above and interpret them to military capabilities. A recent review of the literature on this subject (Rech et al., 2015, p. 56) argue that the research of the military, of militarism, and processes of militarization, should not be undertaken solely for its own sake, but should also be conducted by the probability of engagement with the forces and institutions responsible, and should not be bashful about doing so. So, to be critical is to be involved in critique; it is not to be dismissive. Critical engagement with military forces, and military and militarized institutions, can be underpinned by comprehension of these institutions as accountable to the civilian world, and necessarily understood as potentially open to collaboration and knowledge exchange, even where this opinion may initially seem ridiculous. Aircraft development of the US in the interwar period is an excellent example of assessing the strategic environment and creating appropriate military capabilities.

When President Franklin Roosevelt and Congress collaborated to enlarge the US armed forces, they invested in the navy and army aviation (Allan, 2007, p. 342). The premise for doing that was because they did not anticipate the land threat in future wars. Political and military leadership predicted the war with Japan and envisioned the naval war fight in the Central Pacific, where land-based air would be scarce and vulnerable. These considerations set the conditions the rise of the US aircraft carrier fleet, which was the clearest and one of the most successful innovations of military history.

Recent developments in institutional culture and reform heightened the need for transformation and research such as that conducted by Lindley-French (2006, p. 269) showed that transformation is considered specifically to strengthen institutional development with capability. To that end, NATO's transformation is itself designed to provide the Alliance a true structural intervention capability through effective transatlantic military interoperability at ever greater points of influence built around a force concept that highlights advanced expeditionary coalition operations, effects based operations (EBO) and transformative doctrine and capabilities or, as NATO puts it, changing the twentieth century NATO into a twenty-first century force.

3. INNOVATION VIA LESSON LEARNED

Another essential characteristic of the innovative military institution is to have effective lessons learned system. Predominantly in operational lesson learned system, one crucial component of it is required to create an officer corps educated, encouraged to innovate and committed to their profession. German Armed Forces during the interwar era are a good example. As conventionally, German Army practiced the *Auftragstaktik* (mission command philosophy) that encouraged lower echelon commanders to exploit local opportunities, exercise initiative and take a risk. Mission command not only promotes successful decentralized command but also encourages unhindered self-criticism to see the problems and improve an organization. Even after the very successful Polish campaign in 1939, Lewis says that the willingness of German officer corps to improve its army qualitatively through self-criticism and identifying problems were atypical and unique (Lewis, 2014, p. 214). Some analysts (e.g., Foley, 2012, p. 803) have attempted to draw subtle distinctions between military innovation and effective leadership. In his seminal article, Foley identifies that even in the organizational cultural paradigm; individuals perform a focal point in innovation. A close analysis of

the German Army in World War I, however, shows that there exists another, hitherto unexplored, model by which an army can innovate. Rather than being reliant on a few key individuals high in the military hierarchy or several exceptionally bright junior officers who can shape their battlefield experience into new doctrine, the German Army on the Western Front between 1916 and 1918 displays that an organization can innovate without these circumstances. Because of changes on the battlefield, German tactical units emerged new informal doctrine and disseminated this new doctrine extensively throughout the Army without expecting this to come from above. Consequently, throughout the war, official German doctrine tended to lag behind the practice in the field. Thus, the case study of the German Army in World War I illustrates us an unconventional model of military innovation – *horizontal* innovation, which is another manifestation of Mission Command culture. In this form of military innovation, new notions – best practices or learned lessons – are spread between units, not from the high command down or from the frontline up. In organizations practicing horizontal innovation, the stimulus for the development of new ideas comes directly from the staffs and commands of combatant units seeking out and experiencing new practices and knowledge without

waiting for regulation from above. Furthermore, although individuals are crucial for moving this knowledge, few if any claim 'ownership' of new ideas or doctrine. This type of military innovation is much more flexible than that described by the existing literature on innovation, and, in the case examined here, allowed the German Army to face the challenges of a rapidly transforming battlefield.

As another component of effective lessons learned system, military institutions must ensure that the nature of military doctrines set conditions to foster and promote lesson learned culture among all echelons of the military hierarchy. This finding is in agreement with King's (2006, p. 262, 264) examination, which illustrated a comprehensive analysis of the British army's doctrine developments based on mutually beneficial lessons learned formulation. In his groundbreaking research, King concluded that the primary intent of British doctrine is flexibility. This flexibility is lengthened to the relationship between senior and junior officers and, indeed, all the way downs the chain of command. British military culture actively promotes the ambition of junior commanders. They are trained and supposed to take the initiative if they consider that response launched locally will further the strategic intentions. Modern British doctrine contrasts quite considerably from descriptions of army officer culture in the past. It should be remarked that this new flexibility could not be learned by rote. British Defence Doctrine does not consist of a range of firm and globally applicable beliefs, as it highlights. Doctrine does not conceive solely logical and rational rule following in which individuals apply formulas inflexibly. On the contrary, doctrine assumes a much broader social reality to which it is insolubly correlated. In particular, doctrine flows from and is applied about a particular social group – the members of Britain's armed forces. The professional culture of the British military is one such 'form of life' that is generated in the course of this group's movements. This 'form of life' cannot be lessened to a deadening series of autonomous policies. A doctrine is a form of life created by a social group, military professionals, and doctrine gets its life and its reality not from the text, nor any formal set of rules, then, but from the members of the British military acting together as a group. Indeed, the written doctrine is ultimately no more than a description of what members of this group is required to do. Members of the British armed forces can be innovative and flexible because the group of which they are part of actively fosters evolution and individual initiative.

The flexibility which is at the heart of British doctrine is an outcome of a dense social group, whose mutual perceptions are so dominant that members of the organization can innovate autonomously in a way which promotes rather than undermines group coherence and the achievement of collective goals.

4. INTELLECTUALISM ORIENTED SOCIETY

Another essential quality for effective innovation in a military organization is to have experienced, visionary, and emotionally intelligent individuals. By Katz's "Skills of an Effective Administrator" theory, top-level managers must possess the most conceptual and human skills, and the least technical skills (Katz, 1955, p. 34). Moffet gave a successful example of having the skills of an effective military leader who designed the US naval aviation in the interwar era. He was not as super intelligent as many officers in a navy nor was he technically oriented (Trimble, 2014, p. 4). He was an extremely experienced traditional navy officer, a great visionary who believed and conceptualized the future of aviation as an integral part of the navy. He could not achieve this without a deep understanding of human nature, creating a great team in the Bureau of Aeronautics, and building vital connections with higher naval and political officials. It was a time when there were severe budget cuts for military and serious opponents like General William Mitchell who championed the aviation as the separate service as it was in RAF in Britain. Moffet's mastery of human skills to gain the trust and respect of the political officials and effective use of mass media gained upper hand against Mitchell and made carrier aircraft development one of the most successful innovations in the military history. This also accords with Dandeker and Gow's (1999, p. 62) study, which showed that new missions arrange armed forces in a war prevention or peacekeeping manner. The purpose of the armed services in forming stability has significant indications for their traditional culture. In particular, actual fighting roles become of secondary concern. Military victory becomes a tactical aim, with the strategic goal being defined as shaping a solid basis for peace. Military leaders can no longer be supported to think or act in terms of pure military categories but only in correspondence with the broader political goal of shaping the peace. Calculations must not be confined to a military appreciation but include the broader political and social context of the operation.

In the same vein, Esterhuyse (2013, p. 138) in his article regarding South African military culture, found that the most apparent determinant shaping corporate military decision-

making, in general, is defense policy. Armed forces, and armies, in particular, their structure and responsibilities, are shaped by the general security situation of their society and, more concretely, the defense policies of their governments. Any organization is only as good as the leadership afforded by the top. The structure may make up for a lot, but sound leadership is crucial. Some particular concerns affect senior and high-level military leadership and decision-making in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Most of these factors are related in some way or another to the policy and the societal and organizational environments that support or disrupt the executive processes of the SANDF.

Successful military organizations must have enlightened intellectuals to bridge civil-military phenomena as a component of the whole. Beckley (2010, p. 50) provides in-depth analysis and suggest that Western democratic countries with low levels of civil-military disagreement, and high levels of human capital, should be soldier-for-soldier, dollar-for-dollar are more militarily influential and powerful than states that lack these features. The possible implications of these conclusions are enormous, not only for the examination of military power but for the complete range of international relations: if political and social constituents decisively form the formulation of military power, then

a large number of academic theories and policy assessments based on materialist thoughts of military power may be perilously flawed. There might be a plethora of innovative ideas and smart people in military organizations. It is well structured institutional culture of a military organization that required to have and assess the strategic environment, and to process experiences and exercises through well-implemented lessons learned system to identify what is to modernize and how to innovate effectively. These outcomes further support the idea of organizational culture and military intellectualism and the present findings seem to be consistent with Kober's (2011, p. 708) research which he illuminates that the jewel in the crown of military intellectualism, which is also strategy's nucleus universal knowledge, is a history-based military theory, which is assumed to serve as a cornerstone for military doctrines, plans, operations, and lesson learning. In cases where commanders lack combat experience, intellectual activity is one of the few ways of compensating for this void. Although knowledge is best obtained via a combination of combat experience, good intuition, and formal learning, many commanders seem to prefer the first two channels, feeling uncomfortable with the third. The extent to which the military is involved in studying military history and theory appears to be the best sign of the presence of intellectualism.

Organization theory also initiates the question of how innovative technologies and disciplines will be consolidated into national military establishments, whether they will be imitated, and if they can be leveraged efficiently by other states to alter the balance of global influence. A military institution may acquire new technology, but face obstacles to developing the organizational formation or doctrine required to achieve a radical increase in military effectiveness (Goldman and Andres, 1999, p. 93).

The world is not perfect and not always, the best innovative ideas will be supported by the higher military and political officials no matter how perfect institutional culture is. Farrell (2005, p. 465) further points out that means of orthodox warfare offer highly rationalized scripts for military institution and activity. Apparently, such scripts may occasionally be coherent. To be sure, military isomorphism makes sense for great powers, as well as regional powers, which have the assets and requirements to warrant expensive, high-tech conventional forces. That is why, visionary, experienced, and skilled individuals in human relationships must be supported and promoted to higher levels of military bureaucracy to endorse and implement the innovations.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The armed forces in the contemporary sense as a social institution and a tool of the state to achieve political goals by military means developed in modern times to protect the national state interests. Any culture in the course of its evolution attests that it comprises ambivalent configurations, described in particular by aspects of war and peace. In general, culture is orientated towards peace and peaceful permanence, since it is the latter that generates various requirements for its maintenance, but the war is rooted in it so high that it will be somewhat superficial to address only about peace. Therefore, one should pay attention to the culture and, in fact, the military culture of society, since it is oriented toward military professionalism, it embraces many features that are applicable in peaceful circumstances, furthermore, capable of strengthening, sustaining and improving the world. It is a meaningful part of the world system and Pacific culture, as it includes anthropological, scientific, spiritual and aesthetic aspects, that is, all parts of culture that are familiarized to the world. This finding corroborates the ideas of Huntington's (1957, p. 10), who advocated that the distinguishing peculiarities of the military profession as a special kind of activity in the classical definition of are compe-

tence, denoting in leadership, management, and control of an organized mass of people. Also, the responsibility to the state for the performance of their skills and corporate spirit, which is manifested in the presence of a bureaucratic apparatus, traditions and customs, and a particular way of life. The components formulated by Huntington in 1957 to determine professionalism - expertise, responsibility and corporateness are the definition of centuries-old notions about the military profession.

This analytical research and the results obtained from them should focus on the conformity of civil-military institutions that together define the armed forces, which serves to maintain peace and defend it from military intrusions. Additionally, military culture is the basis of the political culture of society. After all, it is apprehended that the stronger the military power, the more independently the state can feel.

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