

DEVELOPMENT OF WAR THEORY. AN OVERVIEW

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It is impossible to find a nation in the world that has existed and still exists that has not faced the trials of war in its history and has not tried to emerge from this war with fewer losses and better results. As for the ways to achieve this, after various observations and generalizations, extremely different and dissimilar views and opinions have emerged from time to time. However, since these ideas and considerations could not go beyond the level of social evolution of the time, the issues of interest were explained in a simple way and were based more on subjective thinking. Although the conclusions of the authors of simple ideas, unscientific generalizations and theories are of historical importance, they failed to reveal the objective causes of wars and the regularities of war management. They also created misconceptions about the emergence and operation of wars. This article briefly aims to create a picture of the development of ideas and concepts about the essence and nature of war from ancient times.

Key words: war, politics, military art, theory of war, state, military security

1. INTRODUCTION

The history of military thought has very ancient roots. Even in the examples of oral creativity of the period predating the discovery of writing, one can find interesting ideas about the people's war trials, the

struggle of good and evil, the heroism of the people's representatives and ways to win over evil (Светлов: 2009, с. 5; Микрюков: 2010; Ларкин: 2014). Even in the most ancient examples of written sources, there is a lot of historical

information about the wars of the time, their conduct, management and consequences. This information leads to the conclusion that the most diverse peoples of the ancient world sought to understand the nature of wars and their regularities, and also tried to form a certain experience in this area. Because the ability to wage wars in a specific historical context was considered as one of the main factors in the protection of statehood itself.

Although the earliest examples of the history of every idea to date contain different views on the causes of wars, most of these examples have viewed wars not as a chaotic, spontaneous event, but as a controlled process. In other words, the ancient intellectuals did not doubt that in order for wars to become a successful process, concrete measures must be taken, purposeful preparations must be made, and battles must be based on well-thought-out plans. In other words, providing the necessary guidance for the preparation and conduct of war was considered an integral part of such military success in ancient times.

2. ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL THINKERS ABOUT WARS

More serious and logical approaches to understanding and comprehend the essence and nature

of wars can still be found in the works of ancient Chinese thinkers and philosophers.

VI-V centuries BC, several interesting works on the theory of warfare appeared in ancient China. One of the works of special value in this regard is the 'Treatise on Military Skills' written by Sun Tzu, who lived in the VI-V centuries BC. Although Sun-Tzu's treatise is mainly devoted to the problems of military skill, it contains interesting views on the military-political activity of the state and the head of state in the field of warfare. According to the author, politics has a dominant role in relation to military work, and the direction of military activity is determined by politics (Handel: 1991, p.13). Explaining the nature of wars in his own way, Sun Tzu said that war is a great task for the state. It is the basis of life and death, the way to destruction or survival. (Светлов: 2009, с. 16).

The works of ancient Greek and Roman thinkers are a new page in the development of military science to understand the nature of war and to study the activities of rulers in connection with war. The high development of martial arts in the Greek and Roman states, the special role of wars in socio-political life did not escape the notice of thinkers of the time, and interesting

ideas and considerations about the nature of war has emerged. Although the political nature of the war is not properly revealed in these views and considerations, certain new ideas have been put forward about the responsibilities and duties of the military-political leadership of the state in connection with the conduct of wars. In this regard, conclusions and generalizations of the Greek philosophers and thinkers Socrates (V-IV centuries BC), Thucydides (460-396 BC), Herodotus (484-425 BC), Xenophon (430-354 BC), Plato (427-347 BC), Aristotle (384-322 BC), the Roman thinker Cicero (106-43 BC) and others are of scientific and historical importance for tracing the history of the development of military thought.

Socrates attributed the cause of wars to the inner qualities of the people. According to him, the main causes of war are human imperfection, the inability to distinguish between good and evil, as well as the violation of the rule of law within the state due to the fault of the rulers (Екадумова: 2012). According to the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, war is a natural state of nations, and therefore wars are both necessary and inevitable (Мильштейн et al., 1957, с. 10). In other words, as noted by experts, Plato put forward an idea that served

to perpetuate war in human life. The Greek philosopher distinguished two types of wars, which he regarded as the natural state of nations - civil and foreign wars. Civil wars have no special place in Plato's theory. He did not consider the conflicts between the Greeks as a war. According to him, the war was a military confrontation between the Greeks and the barbarians. Plato regarded foreign wars as the greatest form of war, and he had a special respect for those who showed courage in such wars (Шерпаев: 1999, с.7).

There are a number of interesting ideas about the nature of wars in Aristotle's works. First of all, he is the author of the 'just war' concept. According to him, the main goal of just wars is to achieve peace and development (ван Альтен: 2015, с. 9). Aristotle also considered the wars for slaves to be a 'just war' (Мильштейн et al., 1957, с. 10). Aristotle also divided wars into two types - civil and foreign wars. He saw civil wars as conflicts within the Greeks, and foreign wars as wars with barbaric neighbors. Aristotle, who justified wars, said that they encouraged people to be just and restrained, and that living in peace would lead them astray (Екадумова: 2012, Глава 1).

Similar ideas can be found in the writings of ancient Roman

thinkers. For instance, according to Marcus Cicero (106-43 BC), the beginning of wars stems from the qualities inherited in human nature, that is, the desire to get rich and the desire for power. According to the author, these passions forced people to engage in armed conflict. Cicero added that human nature is not capable of avoiding war, it can only be included in the normative framework of human culture. According to Cicero, the formation of such a culture required great effort and hard work on the part of the people. It was assumed that after such efforts, people could determine the legal norms of warfare. (Ларкин: 2014). In the early Middle Ages, when Christianity had a strong influence in the West, it is possible to observe the strengthening of religious views on the nature of wars and their conduct. For example, the IV century theologian of Milan, Amvrosi (340-397) sought to explain wars from a religious point of view and called on Christians to take part in wars to protect them from religious infidels (ван АЛТЕН: 2015, с. 12).

The idea of linking the essence of wars with religion can be observed in the works of the eleventh century oriental literary monuments 'Siyasatnameh' (Policy Paper) (Nizamülmülk: 2007) and 'Gabusnameh' (Keykavus:

2006). The 'Siyasatnameh' was written by Abu Ali Hasan ibn Ali Khaja Nizamulmulk, the vizier of the Seljuk rulers of the eleventh century. Nizamulmulk, who had extensive experience in statehood, also commented on state and military issues in his advice on public administration. Neither the 'Gabusnameh' nor the 'Siyasatnameh' has a separate opinion on the nature of wars. However, the general content of these works suggests that both authors linked the beginning of wars and their conduct with religious destiny. Amir Teymur (1336-1405) (Tamerlane), one of the great commanders and rulers of the military history of the East and the world, also linked the emergence of wars with religious origins, destiny, and pointed to its eternity. In the "Tuzuk"s (testaments) which are attributed to this great commander, Amir Teymur not only linked wars to religious destiny, but also to the need to establish peace in countries where oppression and violence took place and where Sharia law was not observed. That is why he considered it necessary for powerful rulers like him to intervene and start a war to end injustice in countries where the rule of law has weakened and disappeared. (Əmir Teymur vəsiyyətləri: 1991, s.89-91).

3. MACHIAVELLI AND EUROPEAN THINKERS ABOUT WARS

It is often observed that the special attention paid to the study of military knowledge in Europe emerged from the XV-XVI centuries. Among the intellectuals and thinkers of this period, the name of the Italian political thinker Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) should be highlighted. Machiavelli, who authored a serious work on the subject of the military, *The Art of War*, saw the emergence and conduct of wars as a normal occasion due to his vision. According to him, one of the main tasks of the state and the rulers was to keep the wars in constant focus. Machiavelli suggested that the policy of the state should be aimed at achieving two main goals - 1) the acquisition of new territories and 2) the preservation of their freedom. He did not consider it right to impose any restrictions on wars. The author noted that states must be able to wage war and be ready for it, because the victory brings honor and prestige to the state. Machiavelli wrote that a wise ruler should think of nothing but war, the rules of war, the science of war, and that waging war is a task that the ruler should not entrust to anyone else. (Макиавелли: 1939, с.32).

According to Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466-1536), a Dutch

thinker who was a contemporary of Machiavelli, the beginning of wars was caused by a decline in the level of morality and intellect among people. As he saw the monarchs as the cause of wars, E. of Rotterdam called on them to reconcile their interests in war and peace with the interests of the people. Therefore, he considered it important to subordinate foreign policy to the interests of the people, to strengthen borders to prevent wars and to expand trade relations between nations. The Dutch thinker was of the opinion that while the measures taken did not prevent wars, they could at least minimize them. (Екадумова: 2012, Глава 2). The German theologian Sebastian Frank (1499-1542) also linked the wars to subjective factors and the will of the people. Frank stated that people must wage war against wars in order to achieve peace, and he called such wars holy wars (Бочарников et al., 2013, с.12).

Since the 17th to the 18th centuries, European countries entered a new stage of economic progress. Such developments led to political activism, as well as opened a new page in the evolution of socio-political thought. From that period, a revival has been observed in the development of martial arts. The specific historical conditions were also accompanied by the emergence

of new theories of war, the emergence of new ideas and considerations about the role of the state in wars.

Thomas Hobbs (1588-1679), one of the philosophers and thinkers of this period, expressed his hatred of war, but also put forward the idea of its permanence. He attributed the start of wars to the imperfection of the human mind, the imperfection of the public consciousness, and did not rule out the presence of political elements. According to T. Hobbs, it was the desire to compete, distrust and gain fame that led people to war (Шерпаев: 1999, с.10). In the works of the XVII and XVIII century philosophers Charles Louis Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Jean-Jacques Russo (1712-1778), one can find some interesting ideas about the nature of wars. For instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, considered wars as a result of civil society dominated by private property. According to him, as long as there is private property, which creates inequality, there will be wars (Ларкин: 2014).

The works of classical German philosophers of the XVIII century and special contributions I.Kant (1724-1804) and Hegel (1770-1831) who made a special contribution to the development of philosophical thought, also contain a number of ideas about the nature of war. Kant described the natural state of people

as a state of war. Kant also saw the instability of the internal situation in the country as one of the reasons for the war. According to Kant, a state ruled by lawlessness and injustice would always try to interfere with its neighbours. He saw such incidents as one of the reasons for the war in interstate relations. In his opinion, many states were trying to occupy the territory of another state in order to ensure lasting peace, which led to wars. In order to prevent wars that threaten humanity, Kant considered it necessary to establish lawful relations between states and to enlighten and morally improve people (Екадумова: 2012, Глава 3).

Unlike Kant, Hegel did not believe in the possibility of lasting peace between people and states, and tried to reveal the essence of war by applying a new method. According to him, a possible lasting peace could lead to stagnation in all spheres of life. On the other hand, development required a periodic movement among people. According to Hegel, wars arose from the nature of existing ones, and he saw these wars as a matter of protecting the spiritual health of nations. He believed that ultimately warring states would be strengthened, that internal strife would be prevented, and that nations would be more united. (Екадумова: 2012, Глава 3; Шерпаев: 1999, с.12).

4. JOMINI AND CLAUSEVITZ'S THEORIES ABOUT WARS

The rapid development of socio-political thought from the XVIII century laid the foundation for the formation of military science as a separate field. The independent formation of this field of science was also associated with the rapid development of martial arts, the need to develop a scientific and theoretical basis for the success of the growing mass wars. From this point of view, the XVIII and XIX centuries can be characterized as a period of revival of military science, military-scientific knowledge. Among the military thinkers of this period were the English general Heinrich Lloyd (1756-1763), the German Henry Dietrich Byulov (1757-1807) and the Austrian military man Erzerg Karl (1771-1847). In their writings, these generals focused more on war and martial arts. However, their work is of particular importance in raising military science and military thought to a new level (Свечина: 1926, с. 69).

The study of the nature and essence of wars has been raised to a qualitatively new level in the works of Henry Jomini (1779-1869) and Karl Clausewitz (1780-1831), who were at the height of world military-scientific thought in the nineteenth century. H. Jomini for the first time among military thinkers sought to

create a theory that could shed light on all areas of military work. He tried to formulate his theory through the prism of military art, and therefore his military-scientific research was dominated by those issues, and he even envisioned war politics as one of the principles of it. It is clear from the author's subsequent explanations that the principle of war policy refers to the political nature of the war, and that this area is more relevant to the activities of state rulers. In other words, H. Jomini pointed to the political connection of war at the beginning of his famous work "The Art of War" (Jomini et al., 2007, p.7).

Jomini paid close attention to the assessment of the nature of the state's policy in determining the nature of wars. Jomini unequivocally accepted that wars were started by states. According to him, states engaged in wars in the following cases:

- To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;
- To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, manufactures, or agriculture;
- To uphold neighbouring states whose existence is necessary either for the safety of the government or the balance of power;
- To fulfil the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;

-To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to defend them;

-To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of territory;

-To defend the threatened independence of the state;

-To avenge insulted honour; or,

- From a mania for conquest

(Jomini et al., 2007, p.9).

H. Jomini also distinguished the following types of war: offensive wars to reclaim rights, of defensive wars from political point of view, and offensive in a military point of view, wars of expediency, wars with or without allies, wars of intervention, aggressive wars for conquest and other reasons, wars of opinion, national wars, civil wars, and wars of religion, double wars, and the danger of undertaking two wars at once (Jomini et al., 2007, p.10-26).

A more complete definition of wars can be found in Clausewitz's famous work on war. This work is a vivid expression of Clausewitz's lifelong research and experience, and remains one of the most valuable works on war in the world to date. Clausewitz, who achieved more serious and scientific generalizations by studying and continuing the military knowledge that existed before him, remains one of the greatest representatives of the

history of world military thought. Clausewitz's theoretical legacy is one of the main sources cited today in the study of a number of areas of military work. In fact, Clausewitz's work can be considered the culmination and higher level in the history of military thought before him. Therefore, Clausewitz's scientific and theoretical work remains relevant until today.

One of Clausewitz's greatest contributions to the history of military thought was his insights into the nature of war. He defines war as duel on a large scale, an act of force (violence) to compel our enemy to do our will (von Clausewitz et al., 1976, p.75). In Clausewitz's view, the war should never be thought as an autonomous but as an instrument of policy (von Clausewitz et al., 1976, p.88). As he famously wrote, war is merely continuation of policy by other means. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it (von Clausewitz et al., 1976, p.87). According to him political intercourse does not end with the outbreak of war, and this intercourse is not replaced by something else, ruled by no law but its own. On the contrary, he states that the main lines along which military events progress are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. Clausewitz wrote that political relations does not

stop between peoples and between governments when diplomatic notes are no longer exchanged as war is just another expression of their thoughts reflected in diplomatic notes. (von Clausewitz et al., 1976, p.605).

Clausewitz argued that war could never be considered in isolation from political relations. If this were attempted, the ropes linking war and politics would be broken, we would be left with something pointless and devoid of sense. It was said that policy converts destructive element of war into a mere instrument, by turning the horrors of war into an ordinary weapon, demanded that all forces be mobilized to raise this weapon. Since war is an integral part of politics, it has to accept the character of this policy. As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, then war also expands and becomes more dangerous (von Clausewitz et al., 1976, p.605-606).

According to Clausewitz, it is not right to make politics dependent on the war. Because policy provokes war, and it is a guiding intelligence and war is its instrument, not vice versa. Clausewitz wrote that war does not happen suddenly and that it is impossible to ignite it at once. War emerges as a continuation of a long-standing policy (von Clausewitz et al., 1976, p.607).

When Clausewitz spoke of politics, he was referring to a policy

aimed at protecting the interests of the state on the basis of certain norms, rather than personal interests, the implementation of individual claims, and the activities of judges subjected to ambition. In order to clarify the nature of war, he also tried to clarify the nature of such a policy.

Towards the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century, German Field Marshal Henry Moltke (1800-1891), French Marshal Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929), Alfred Schlieffen (1833-1913), and Hans Delbrueck (1848-1929) contributed to the development of military thought and the formation of military science. These servicemen had a rich military experience, holding high military positions for a long time. Therefore, in the works of these military theorists, practical issues, more actual issues of military art of the time are more widely covered, and in their works, war-politics, war-state policy issues have not been the subject of such a broad analysis. Only Field Marshal H. Moltke devoted some space to military and political issues in his famous work "War Exercises" (Moltkes kriegslehren). However, in this case, he could not bring anything new to the views expressed by Clausewitz (Мольтке:1936, с.9).

5. SOCIALIST THEORY OF WARS

From the second half of the XIX century, the socialist theory of war began to take shape. This theory is associated with the names of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The conclusions reached by Marx and Engels in defining the nature of wars and armies were regarded as a theory that even revolutionized Soviet military science. The socialist ideologues claimed that Marx and Engels, by criticizing the pre-existing military-theoretical knowledge, applied the materialist-dialectical method to them, laid the foundation of the objective science of war and peace, and developed a methodology for solving problems related to these issues (Волкогонов : 1984, p.7).

In the military-theoretical ideas of K. Marx and F. Engels, the views on the nature and causes of wars, the relation of war with politics, the classification of wars were written through class conflict. For example, according to them, the emergence of wars was associated with the emergence of class societies, private property. Marx and Engels emphasized that the strengthening of the exploitative nature of private property, the sharpening of contradictions within the exploiting society, and orientation of the results of material production mainly into

the aggressive goals were the main causes of war. At the same time, they believed that the elimination of class society, private property would end the war. According to Marx and Engels, class inequality and antagonistic relations arising from class inequality within society were the main reasons for the outbreak of wars. They also argued that the policy that led to the war, accompanied by armed violence, was rooted in the inequality created by the economic relations of the exploiting society (private property). According to Marx and Engels, the cause of wars must be rooted in the economy regardless of the reason of its inception. In other words, inequality in economic relations eventually led to sharp confrontation and war. For instance, Engels stated that violence is a means of war. The goal is to gain economic benefits (Волкогонов et al., 1977, c. 18-19).

The theoretical approach of Lenin (1870-1924), characterized as a new stage of Marxism, is also characterized by a class approach to the definition and classification of wars, their causes and driving forces. It is known that the theory of socialism, founded by Marx and Engels, was continued by Lenin and raised to a new level. He was characterized as a great theorist and strategist of the socialist structure of

society and the proletarian revolution in the former Soviet military-historical literature (Азовцев:1981, с. 3). Lenin described the war as a continuation of politics by force, and stated that the basis of this idea was formed by Clausewitz. He regarded Clausewitz as one of the most profound philosophers on military issues, and wrote that Marxists rightly based Clausewitz's popular view of war on the nature of wars (Ленин: 1957, с.421).

According to the scientific and historical literature, although Lenin accepted the opinion of the German general and war philosopher K. Clausewitz that "war is a continuation of politics by other means", he replaced the phrase "by other means" with "violent means" and improved his thinking. But Lenin did more than improvement of one expression. He also approached Clausewitz's definition of war from a different perspective. Actually, the fact that war is an act of violence (war is an act of violence to compel the enemy to do our will) is also presented by Clausewitz as discussed in part four of this article. Lenin made his own definition by combining both Clausewitz's definitions on war. Even in some of Lenin's works, he simply repeated Clausewitz's famous idea and presented war as a continuation of politics by other means (Ленин:

1957, с. 76, 77). In other words, from a formal point of view, there is no difference between Clausewitz's definition of war and Lenin's definition of war. The difference is in the content behind each of them. In Clausewitz' view, the policy that led to the war was a continuation of the foreign policy of the states. He saw the war as a continuation of the state's foreign policy pursued by other means, such as the use of the army. In Lenin's view, the policy that led to the war was a policy based on private property and the existing economic relations, which were intensified between exploited and the exploiting classes.

Lenin argued that in a class (stratified) society, the country's domestic policy reflected the interests of the ruling class (stratum), so this policy had a strong influence on the nature and character of the country's foreign policy. It was the desire to secure the interests of the ruling classes that led to the war. Lenin unequivocally linked the beginning of the war with class interests, and saw the way to its elimination in the destruction of class society. In this sense, the term "violent means" in the phrase "war is a continuation of politics by violent means" was given a special meaning by Lenin, and this meaning was associated with class struggle. For example,

if this expression was replaced by “other means” (or means of force) as mentioned by Clausewitz, then Lenin’s term “violent means” would have lost its political meaning. Because “means of force” could mean a legitimate armed forces organized and maintained by the state, however, “violent means” refers to an organization that serves the interests of the ruling class and is armed to ensure the interests of the ruling class by application of violence. Therefore, the destruction of class society, the abolition of private property, and the destruction of the armed forces which was an organization to implement the violence with dictum of one class on another class, was considered to be the main conditions for eliminating the causes of wars. Lenin saw the way to achieve this in the class struggle, in the destruction of the property class and the state that reflected their interests, in the creation of a proletarian dictatorship that would destroy this state (ЛЕНИН: 1957, с.373).

Thus, Lenin and his advisers began to fight for the establishment of the socialist revolution in the whole country against the private owners, who made up almost half of the population of a large country like Russia. This struggle was not only a political, ideological, economic and moral struggle, but also a military.

The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, were able to gain the upper hand in this struggle through great massacres. The Bolshevik government was not only established in Russia, but also spread to the countries that had once declared independence from Russia through war. As a result, the requirements of Lenin’s doctrine of war were implemented in both Russia and the Russian-occupied republics, and were accepted as the dominant ideology. That is, by inciting the civil war in the country, the private property class was destroyed and the power of the proletarian dictatorship based on weapons was established.

6. NEW APPROACHES ON WARS

As long as the Soviet Union and the socialist front existed, Lenin’s theory of war continued to be an integral part of socialist theory. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the socialist front, new views on the socialist theory of war emerged. In particular, the military-political processes, wars and military conflicts that have taken place in the world in recent decades have given rise to many new ideas about the definition of war. It should be distinctly noted that Clausewitz’s famous definition remains the leading thesis for defining the essence of war. However, as the global context

and technology evolves, so new approaches, ideas and thoughts on the nature of war emerges. As war is such a complex and multifaceted socio-political event that it is impossible to cover all its nature and aspects in a simple definition. On the other hand, the methods and means of warfare are changing in contemporary world. Most of the regional wars in recent years have been fought by non-state actors and are taking place on a smaller scale. At the same time, the use of asymmetric wars has increased. These also require further clarification of the concept of war in the academic literature. The emergence of new ideas and concepts for a deeper understanding of the nature of war is also related to this need.

It is impossible to comment all the ideas in one article and concepts put forward by various authors on the definition of war in recent years. There is also been disputes as to which forms of conflict to include and which not to include in defining war. This task has even been more complicated as word “war” has been used by the politicians to describe a whole array of policy agendas alien to traditional ideas of warfare such as a War on Drugs, a War on Poverty and a War on a Cancer and etc (Pilbeam: 2015a, p.88).

According to Bruce Pilbeam one of the most useful modern definitions of war is articulated by Hedley Bull, who defines it as (Pilbeam: 2015a, p.90):

“War is organized violence carried on by political units against each other. Violence is not war unless it is carried out in the name of political unit; what distinguishes killing in war from murder is its vicarious and official character, the symbolic responsibility of the unit whose agent the killer is. Equally, violence carried out in the name of a political unit is not war unless it is directed against another political unit.” (Bull: 2012, p.178)

Like many other theorists and thinkers H.Bull also recognize violence as fundamental element of war. However, he does not limit war waging agents only to states by employing wider category of ‘political units’ which can also include non-state actors. Moreover, he stresses the importance of political units as warring parties that any armed to conflict to be called a war. This definition eliminates any armed conflict among parties for economic gains to be called as war no matter how severe are the consequences. Moreover, in this definition the war is considered war if only it is legitimate. However, no doubt the character of contemporary wars is

changing, the number of illegitimate conflicts is raising, monopoly on who wages legitimate war and a line between legitimate wars and murder or crimes becomes foggier than ever.

In the academic literature there are several labels that has been forwarded to describe the nature of contemporary wars such as 'postmodern wars' and 'hybrid wars' and 'new wars' in which the last one has achieved the greatest and most lasting prominence (Pilbeam: 2015b, p.105). Mary Kaldor, one of the most important theorists of new wars in her book 'New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era' (published in 1998, 2006 and in 2012) distinguishing new wars from old ones with Clausewitz seen as the most significant theorist of the latter. Kaldor suggest that what policy makers and military leaders define as war is specific phenomenon which took shape in Europe between fifteenth and eighteenth century which bound up with evolution of modern state (Kaldor: 2012, p.15). Standing armies under control of the state was an essential element in monopolization of legitimate violence and state interest become the legitimate justification for war (Kaldor: 2012, p.19).

Kaldor argues that in the context of globalization and increased number of failed states, autonomy of

states on monopoly of the legitimate organized violence erodes. In this environment all the essential elements what defines war, *goals, actors, finances and methods*, has changed. In new wars non-state actors such as paramilitaries, warlords, criminal gangs, mercenaries, private security contractors share the monopoly of using violence with state actors. Kaldor describes new wars as mixture of war (organizes violence for political ends), crime (organized violence for private ends) and human rights violations (violence against civilians) (Kaldor: 2012, p.207).

Kaldor claims that goals of new wars are about identity politics (claiming power on the basis of identity such as ethnicity, religion or tribe) in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars (Kaldor: 2012, p.7). She argues that aim of contemporary identity politics is to gain access to the state for not to implement programmes in broader social interest as was the case in old wars, but to promote the agendas of particular groups (Pilbeam: 2015b, p.106).

Another main characteristic of new wars is related with how it is conducted. Kaldor argues that in conventional wars battles were the decisive and to capture territories was the goal of war. However, in new wars battles are avoided as

much as possible and territories are controlled through political control of population rather than military advances. The aim is to control population by getting rid of different identity and opinion by instilling terror which is achieved by mass killings, forced displacement, as well as range of political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidations. (Kaldor: 2012, p.7). Kaldor strongly argues that in new wars most violence is targeted against civilians rather than combatants (Kaldor: 2012, p.212).

The change in actors, goals and warfare leads to change in war economy. Kaldor call it new 'globalized' war economy which is exactly opposite of war economies of two world wars where source of finance was states and it was centralized. However, new war economies are decentralized. The finance is coming from external resources (humanitarian aid, diaspora, support from neighbouring countries), smuggling of valuable commodities (oil or diamonds or human trafficking), pillaging, drugs, and hostage taking (Kaldor: 2012, p.10). In these conditions continuous use of violence is key to keep economy to function which makes new wars longer and inconclusive. Here Kaldor argues that new wars tend to be mutual enterprise rather

than a contest of wills as is implied by Clausewitz. The contest of will implies that enemy must be crushed and therefore war tends to extremes. However, mutual enterprise implies that both sides need each other in order to benefit from its economy and therefore new wars tends to be endless and actors are interested in enterprise of war rather than winning or losing. The inner tendencies of new wars are not war without limits (in terms of application of force/violence) but war without end (Kaldor, 2012: p.218). In Kaldor's definition war is not an instrument to subdue your enemy, on the contrary it is an instrument together with your enemy waged on civilians for political and economic gains.

Furthermore, Sean Mcfate, a professor of war in US National Defence University, in his book *New Rules of War in Durable Disorder*, challenges some commonly accepted fundamental characteristics of definition of war. He argues that believing that wars are fought purely political reasons are wrong, as economic self-interest is not less important than the political self-interest (McFate: 2019, p.180). Another commonly accepted character in war definition he challenges is that of who gets to wage war. Assuming that states – only states – have the privilege of legitimately

waging war is a Westphalian idea, which is an obsolete and wrong as he argues that war has move beyond most war experts' understanding (McFate: 2019, p.181). Mcfate agrees with majority that 'war is the armed politics' which is the only true law of it. In this line he sheds light on two aspects of this definition. Firstly, this idea (war is the armed politics) means that victory is as much political as military. Moreover, he reaffirms greatest thinkers by recognizing that war is neither inherently evil, nor it is inherently military although it does involve organized violence, or the threat of it, and it does wreak human suffering. It will be failure to search for bloodless solutions to bloody problems, resulting in greater bloodshed. Here, Mcfate argues that militaries misread this powerful truth by preferring to eliminate the enemy first, then negotiate political issues second. However, you do not need to win battles to win the war (McFate: 2019, p.222).

In the second aspect of the definition, Mcfate proposes that politics is not the sole province of states, and war can be waged by the state and nonstate actors alike. It can be waged for many reasons, for economic gain, religious beliefs, identity, culture, glory, revenge, and many other things, in addition to purely political ones. Additionally,

he rejects classification of war as 'conventional' and 'unconventional' and stresses that there is only a "war" (McFate: 2019, p.184). He also makes clear difference between war and warfare, as the nature of the first one does not change, but the latter change due to weapons, tactics, technology, leadership and circumstances (McFate: 2019, p.27). In this regard, he claims that in contemporary global context the political power does not come out of barrel of gun (McFate: 2019, p.104) as his main thesis in the book formulates around the idea that brute force, military power is not the determining factor anymore in winning wars. There are other powerful means like weaponizing refuges, information, election cycles, money, and the law (McFate: 2019, p.228).

What is certain that contemporary wars, however they are called, are very different to those of the past in terms of actors, goals, warfare and sources of finances. In modern context, with impact of globalization, increase number of failed and weakening states, character of war has changed. States has lost its monopoly in use of legitimate violence. Legitimacy of violence has also lost its ground in contemporary wars. All sorts of non-state actors are waging wars for many reasons other than political ones. In these realities

sticking to one simple definition of war makes it hard to capture the character of new wars.

7. CONCLUSIONS

No doubt wars have always been the indispensable part of human history. It would be naïve to wish for a world without war. However, understanding essence of it, could minimize the effects of it or would enable those actors that would attempt to stop it. The debate on the cause, nature and ways to conduct it will always be topical theme of human history. From the earliest times, intellectuals have tried to express their thoughts and ideas in this direction. Clausewitz's definition of war has played an important role in defining the nature of war. However, as we see in the discussions of new war theorists even challenge the ideas of Clausewitz which has been the reference point for the wars of last two hundred years. The monopoly of states on legitimate use of violence is seriously challenged, even so the goals to conduct wars demonstrates different patterns than previous ones. Non-state actors are as capable as states to wage wars. Those who are responsible for the national security of country from foreign aggression believe that 'subduing enemy with brute force is the way to achieve one's political goal' eventually will

have totally different approach to 'war' as an instrument than others who believe that political power does not stem from the barrels of gun anymore or from who believe war itself is the goal as mutual enterprise for political and economic gains. To provide a single definition to war risks to oversimplify the phenomenon which could ultimately hamper understanding its essence.

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