

FRAMEWORK OF ASCOPE/PMESII FOR MILITARY CONFLICT ANALYSIS IN RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

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The Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022-2024 began because Russia considered Ukraine's joining NATO would cause NATO members to side with Russia's military, and this was considered a threat to Russia. This incident highlights the evolution of modern warfare, which includes a combination of conventional, asymmetric, cyber, and non-military warfare.

This study uses a qualitative approach with deductive reasoning, supported by a comprehensive literature review. The results show that Russia's strategy focuses on controlling strategic areas and destabilizing Ukraine's politics, while Ukraine adopts a defense strategy that utilizes international support and power asymmetry. The ASCOPE/PMESII analysis reveals how both parties use various aspects of the operational environment (Area), infrastructure (Structures), capabilities (Capabilities), organizations (Organizations), society (People), and events (Events), as well as political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure dimensions (PMESII) to achieve their respective goals.

This study offers theoretical contributions to understanding the complexity of resource-based warfare, provides practical implications for the Indonesian Navy in dealing with hybrid threats, and provides managerial recommendations for decision-makers in designing adaptive defense policies. The implications of the Russia-Ukraine war provide educational, inspiring, and instructive insights for the Indonesian Navy in facing future geopolitical challenges..

Key words: *Russia-Ukrainian war, ASCOPE/PMESII analysis, geopolitics, national security.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The development of technology and information has created new models in today's warfare. The use of military and non-military capabilities is carried out to combine forces to create a stronger force. The combination of conventional warfare, asymmetric warfare, modern warfare, cyber warfare, and other non-military warfare is practiced and carried out in the current Russia-Ukraine war conflict [1]. This conflict stems from the long history of the two countries that are intertwined, which continues to complicate their relationship. Ukraine, as one of the countries formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, has struggled to build a stable government and strengthen relations with other countries in the world. However, in 2014, relations between Russia and Ukraine deteriorated when Ukraine decided to move closer to the Western Bloc and postponed the signing of a proposed partnership agreement with the European Union.

In September 2020, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved a new National Security Strategy that emphasized the importance of developing a special partnership with NATO. This strategic move reflects Ukraine's commitment to enhancing its security and defense capabilities through cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [2].

By emphasizing the development of a special partnership with NATO, Ukraine aims to strengthen its defense capabilities, enhance interoperability with NATO forces, and deepen cooperation in various security areas. This strategic alignment with NATO is of particular importance to Ukraine as it faces complex regional security challenges and seeks to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The armed conflict between the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian separatists continues and has resulted in many casualties and hundreds of thousands of civilians forced to flee, until finally on February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared war on Ukraine, and since then Russia's military operations against Ukraine have begun.

The war between Russia and Ukraine in 2022 is a very complex and multidimensional conflict. This military operation is referred to as Russia's step in criticizing Ukraine for not joining NATO. Russia considers that Ukraine's joining NATO will cause NATO members to side with the military in Russia, and this is considered a threat to Russia [3]. This Russian invasion did not make Ukraine silent, a strategy was carried out by Ukraine to defend its territory from Russian attacks.

The use of information technology in this war is also carried out by using cyberwar as one of

the strategies of both parties. In the current war, the use of non-military forces is carried out as a strategy to achieve victory, the non-military forces used include the use of information systems, building alliances with friendly countries, and building defense force arguments to the global community [4]. The war between Russia and Ukraine has provided several relevant lessons not only for those directly involved but also for the international community as a whole.

According to Rațiu & Munteanu [5], the success of a mission depends on the level of understanding achieved by the leader by integrating techniques for analyzing various aspects of the human terrain into the military decision-making process. Research by Qureshi et al [6] entitled Russia-Ukraine war and systemic risk: Who is taking the heat? Warns against the accumulation of systemic risk because sanctions can harm countries other than their main target, namely Russia. The Ukraine-Russia war has a significant trade impact on Ukraine and Russia, but only a limited impact on other countries [7].

This study aims to gain an understanding and analysis of resource-based warfare strategies applied from the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022-2024 using Clausewitz's theory of war which emphasizes the relationship between politics and war, as well as strategy theory to

understand a systematic approach to achieving military goals amidst uncertainty. The analytical method applied is ASCOPE/PMESII, which is an analytical framework that integrates aspects of *Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events* (ASCOPE) with *Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure* (PMESII). This method is used to evaluate the Russia-Ukraine war strategy in 2022-2024 from various multidimensional perspectives so that educational, inspiring, and instructive benefits are obtained for the Indonesian Navy.

This study provides strategic insights for the Indonesian Navy regarding resource-based warfare patterns, which can be an important reference in facing geopolitical challenges and hybrid threats in the future, in addition to the complexity of modern conflicts involving conventional, cyber, and non-military warfare, as well as the use of information technology in military strategy offered in this study.

The gap in this study lies in the focus of the analysis which only uses the ASCOPE/PMESII method without integrating other approaches, which can provide a broader perspective. In addition, there is also a lack of discussion about the long-term implications of this war on global geopolitical stability and how resource-based war strategies

can be applied outside the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This indicates the need for further research to enrich multidimensional analysis and expand the scope of the study. In theory, this study contributes to the development of an understanding of the relationship between war strategy and contemporary geopolitical dynamics, especially in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which can enrich the military strategy literature. In practice, the results of this study provide applicable insights for the Indonesian Navy in formulating adaptive and responsive defense strategies to hybrid threats, as well as improving the ability to analyze situations in the field. Thus, this study not only contributes to the development of theory but also provides practical and strategic guidance for military institutions in facing future challenges.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Theory of War

Carl von Clausewitz, a Russian military thinker, developed a theory of war that emphasized its complex and multidimensional nature. In his view, war is not just a military action, but a social and political phenomenon that is closely related to the goals of the state. Clausewitz argued that war is a never-ending cycle, and Clausewitz famously

wrote, 'To ensure peace is to prepare for war.' In what Clausewitz called his theoretical concept of war, he outlined three goals of war [8]. First, the enemy's armed forces must be destroyed. Second, the state must be occupied. Third, the enemy's will must be broken.

Furthermore, Clausewitz introduced the concept of the "trinity" of war, consisting of 1) primordial violence, hostility, and hatred 2) chance and probability, and 3) the element of war subordinate to rational policy. The trinity serves as a magnet to balance the three forces of war - the people, the military, and the statesmen. Clausewitz argued that the spirit that fuels war must be present in the people, the courage and talent of the commanders and soldiers play a role in possibility and opportunity, but political goals are only the business of the government. In fact, without all three branches working in harmony, there will be war [9]. Clausewitz's theory remains relevant today because it provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the dynamics of war and the relationship between politics and the military.

2.2. Human Resource Theory

Strategy theory is the study of how to achieve military objectives amid uncertainty and complexity. The strategy involves planning,

organizing, and using resources to achieve competitive advantage and win conflicts. In the military context, "Strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose. It is neither military power purpose nor political purpose. by strategy means the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the end of policy" [10]. It includes the selection of strategic objectives, the development of operational plans, and the management of available resources.

- a. According to Von Clausewitz in his book entitled *Vom Kriege* or *On War*, Von Clausewitz argues "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means", War is an act of violence to force the opponent to submit to our will, the opponent must be made helpless by destroying his military strength, seizing his country and conquering the will to fight [11]. Regarding war strategy, Clausewitz stated "Strategy is The Art of The Employment of Battles, Mean to Gun The Object of War (Strategy is the art of fighting, as a means of achieving war goals). He also stated, "Strategy is the use of the engagement for war (strategy is the use of battles for war purposes)".

In addition, context of war strategy, to grow national power, the term Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics DIME is known. DIME is used to determine the Course of Action in dealing with enemy actions or threats faced [12].

- b. According to Hart's strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy" (the art/skill of distributing and using (ways) military means (means) to achieve the ultimate goals of policy (ends)" [13]. From the definition, it is known that Strategy is the Science and art of determining goals (ends), formulating the methods taken (ways) and determining the infrastructure (means) used to achieve the goals. So the formulation of a strategy must contain goals (ends), the methods taken (ways), and the infrastructure (means) used. Russia and Ukraine use Strategy according to Liddell Hart in different ways, the interests of each country are different, where Russia has an interest in supporting the People of Donetsk and Luhansk, while Ukraine is interested in defending its territory.

2.3. ASCOPE/PMESII Analysis

Theory

ASCOPE/PMESII is a comprehensive analytical framework used to understand and evaluate the operational environment in military and civilian contexts. This framework consists of five aspects, namely Areas, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events (ASCOPE) / Political, Military, Social, Economic, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII). To form a structured approach to an action in the operational environment and analyze the external environment as a whole [15].

By combining these two components, ASCOPE/PMESII analysis allows for a holistic

understanding of how various factors interact and influence the course of the conflict.

In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War, ASCOPE/PMESII analysis is used to evaluate the strategies implemented by both parties. From a Russian perspective, this analysis highlights the importance of military and political factors in achieving its strategic goals, namely preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and maintaining geopolitical influence in the region. [16]. Russia uses conventional military superiority and information warfare to support its military operations. From a Ukrainian perspective, this analysis emphasizes the role of social and information

PMESII-PT	Political	Military	Economic	Social	Infrastructure	Information
ASCOPE:						
Areas	Political Areas	Military Areas	Economic Areas	Social Areas	Infrastructure Areas	Information Areas
Structures	Political Structures	Military Structures	Economic Structures	Social Structures	Infrastructure Structures	Information Structures
Capabilities	Political Capabilities	Military Capabilities	Economic Capabilities	Social Capabilities	Infrastructure Capabilities	Information Capabilities
Organizations	Political Organizations	Military Organizations	Economic Organizations	Social Organizations	Infrastructure Organizations	Information Organizations
People	Political People	Military People	Economic People	Social People	Infrastructure People	Information People
Events	Political Events	Military Events	Economic Events	Social Events	Infrastructure Events	Information Events

Fig. 1. Matrices ASCOPE/PMESII.

Source: Tunning [14].

factors in building civil resistance and rallying international support. Ukraine also uses asymmetric tactics and information technology to counter Russia's larger military power.

Through ASCOPE/PMESII analysis, this study aims to identify relevant lessons for the Indonesian Navy in facing modern security challenges. Understanding the operational environment, the ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances, and the use of information technology are increasingly important in today's conflicts. In addition, the ability to build strategic alliances and partnerships, and mobilize public support, are also key factors in facing complex security threats. Thus, ASCOPE/PMESII analysis provides valuable insights for the Indonesian Navy in formulating an effective and adaptive defense strategy.

3. METHODOLOGY

In this case study, the 2022-2024 Russia-Ukraine conflict is the main focus of the analysis to understand the military strategies of both parties. This study uses a qualitative approach with a deductive method to explore in depth the complexities of modern warfare, including political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure aspects. The ASCOPE/PMESII analytical framework is used to evaluate the multidimensional aspects of this conflict. Data collection was carried out through literature studies covering academic

literature, official reports, strategic documents, and analysis from military experts. To strengthen the validity of data interpretation, internal brainstorming, and discussions with experts in the fields of military strategy, geopolitics, modern warfare, and military practitioners from the Indonesian Navy were also conducted. This research was conducted at the Navy Staff and Command School (Seskoal) by utilizing global data and literature studies relevant to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

A deductive qualitative approach was applied in this study, the sequence of steps is as follows:

- First, the study begins by identifying relevant theories, namely Clausewitz's theory of warfare, strategy theory, and ASCOPE/PMESII analysis theory.
- Second, based on these theories, a conceptual framework is formulated that will be used to analyze the case study of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
- Third, data is collected through a literature study that includes academic literature, official reports, and analysis by military experts.
- Fourth, the collected data is analyzed using the ASCOPE/PMESII framework to identify patterns and trends in military strategies implemented by both conflicting parties.
- Fifth, the results of the

analysis are compared with previously formulated theories to confirm or reject the initial hypothesis.

4. RESULT

The results of the analysis show that Russia's strategy in the 2022-2024 Ukrainian conflict focuses on achieving political goals through the use of measured military force, with the main goal of securing strategic areas and preventing Ukraine from joining NATO.

4.1. Analysis Based on Clausewitz's Theory of War

This study adapts Clausewitz's trinity concept to analyze the Russia-Ukraine war through three main elements: People, Military, and Statesman. This analysis aims to understand how these three elements interact and influence the course of the conflict, as well as their implications for the strategies implemented by both parties.

a. People

The "People" element reflects the emotional, cultural, and social aspects of the war. In the Russian context, the narrative constructed by the government about "special military operations" aimed at protecting ethnic Russians in Ukraine and preventing NATO expansion has succeeded in mobilizing domestic support. However, the escalation of the conflict and the economic impact of international sanctions have begun

to raise doubts among the Russian public. In Ukraine, the "People" element manifested itself in high levels of patriotism and widespread civil resistance. Support from the Ukrainian diaspora around the world also provided an important resource for the Ukrainian government. Global public opinion, which largely supported Ukraine, exerted political and economic pressure on Russia.

b. Military

The "Military" element encompassed the operational and tactical aspects of the war. Russia initially relied on conventional military forces to achieve a quick victory, but stronger-than-expected Ukrainian resistance and logistical problems hampered Russian advances. Tactical adaptation became key, with Russia shifting to a more gradual strategy and focusing on consolidating territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ukraine, with limited resources, adopted a defensive strategy that utilized international support and asymmetric tactics. The use of information technology and cyber warfare also characterized the "Military" element of the conflict.

c. Statesman

The "Statesman" element reflects the high-level political, diplomatic, and strategic objectives that guide the course of the war. Russia's political objective is to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and maintain its geopolitical influence in the region. Russian statesmen use a combination of military pressure,

diplomacy, and information warfare to achieve this objective. Ukraine’s political objective, on the other hand, is to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity and strengthen relations with Western countries. Ukrainian statesmen seek to build an international coalition to pressure Russia politically and economically. The role of international organizations, such as the UN and the European Union, is also an important part of the “Statesman” element in this conflict.

By analyzing the interactions between the People, Military, and Statesman elements, this study provides a more comprehensive

understanding of the complexity of the Russia-Ukraine war. This conflict shows that strategic success depends not only on military power but also on the ability to mobilize popular support, exploit diplomatic opportunities, and adapt to changing operational environments.

4.2. Analysis Based on Strategy Theory

In the context of the 2022-2024 Russia-Ukraine war, strategy analysis can be conducted using the Ends, Ways, and Means framework, which helps identify goals, how to achieve those goals, and the resources used.

Table 1. Comparison of Russian and Ukrainian strategies in the 2022 war.

Strategy	Rusia	Ukraine
Ends	From a strategic perspective, Russia’s primary goal in the Ukraine-Russia war is to maintain its influence over Ukraine and prevent the country from aligning with Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union	Ukraine’s primary goal in the war is to expel Russian forces, protect its citizens, and maintain its independence as a sovereign state. It is important to note that Ukraine’s goal is not only focused on defeating Russia but also on preserving its national identity, territorial integrity, and human rights
Ways	Military Intervention Information Warfare Diplomatic Maneuver Resource Leverage	Conventional Military Tactics Guerrilla Warfare Strategy Diplomatic Maneuver Cyberattacks
Means	Hybrid Warfare Proxy Warfare Military Economic Leverage	Military Economic Means Technological Means Diplomatic Means

a. Ends

Russia's Strategic Objectives. Your document states that Russia has political objectives, namely preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, protecting ethnic Russians in Ukraine, and maintaining Russian geopolitical influence in the region. These objectives translate into military objectives, such as securing strategic areas in eastern and southern Ukraine and destabilizing the pro-Western Ukrainian government. The document also states that these military operations are considered a Russian move to pressure Ukraine not to join NATO.

Ukraine's Strategic Objectives. Ukraine's strategic objectives are to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, strengthen relations with Western countries, and secure military and financial assistance to counter Russian aggression. Ukraine's 2020 National Security Strategy, which emphasizes a special partnership with NATO, reflects these strategic objectives.

b. Ways

Russian Strategy. Russia initially used a conventional offensive strategy to achieve a quick victory (blitzkrieg). However, this strategy failed due to stronger-than-expected Ukrainian resistance and logistical problems. Russia then shifted to a more gradual strategy, focusing on consolidating controlled territory and using hybrid warfare tactics,

including information warfare and economic pressure. Your document also mentions that this Military Operation was described as a Russian move to pressure Ukraine not to join NATO.

Ukraine Strategy. Ukraine adopted a defensive strategy that focused on the denial of objectives and imposing costs. This strategy included the use of international support, civil resistance, asymmetric tactics (such as the use of drones), and information warfare.

c. Means

Russian Resources. Russia relies on significant military power, including modern equipment and trained personnel. Russia also uses its energy reserves as a means to pressure Ukraine and European countries.

Ukraine Resources. Ukraine relies on military and financial assistance from Western countries, support from the local population, and a high level of patriotism. The use of information technology, such as social media, has also been an important tool for Ukraine to mobilize support and counter Russian disinformation.

Analysis based on the Ends, Ways, and Means framework shows that the success of both sides' strategies depends on their ability to balance their ends, means, and available means. Russia, with its resource advantage, seeks to

achieve its political goals through military force. However, Ukraine has managed to hinder Russia's progress by leveraging international support, asymmetric tactics, and high morale.

4.3. ASCOPE/PMESII Analysis

The ASCOPE/PMESII analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment in Ukraine. From the Russian perspective, military (M) and political (P) factors are the most dominant, with a focus on the use of military force to achieve political goals. From the Ukrainian perspective, social (S) and information (I) factors are of great importance, with efforts to build public support and mobilize international opinion. Infrastructure (I) is also an important target for both sides, given its role in supporting military operations and civilian life. A review of the ASCOPE/PMESII analysis method from the Russian & Ukrainian perspectives can be seen in Table 2 and Table 3.

Overall, this study provides valuable insights for the Indonesian Navy in understanding the dynamics of modern conflict and its implications for national defense. The results of this study can be used as learning materials and input in formulating a more effective and adaptive defense strategy. In addition, this study also highlights the importance

of understanding the operational environment (ASCOPE) and the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) dimensions in planning and implementing military operations.

5. DISCUSSION

The 2022-2024 Russia-Ukraine War highlights the complexity of modern warfare that goes beyond conventional domains and includes asymmetric, cyber, and non-military dimensions. Analysis of the strategies of both parties reveals different approaches to utilizing resources and facing emerging challenges. Non-military forces are also used as strategies, including the use of information systems, building alliances with friendly countries, and building defense power arguments with the global community. Russia, with its conventional military advantage, initially adopted a blitzkrieg strategy aimed at achieving a quick victory and overthrowing the Ukrainian government. [17]. Ukraine, in defending its territory, carried out a strategy using modern warfare and utilizing information technology with cyberwar. This is in line with [18] In his book "Geodefense Future Defense Concept" he emphasizes the importance of adapting strategies in dealing with uncertainty on the modern battlefield.

Table 2. ASCOPE/PMESII Analysis Methodology - the Russian-Ukrainian War from a Russian perspective.

	P (Politic)	M (Military)	E (Economic)	S (Social)	I (Infrastructure)	I (Information)
A (Area)	Historical Ties. Geopolitical Strategy Domestic Politics	Donetsk and Luhansk; Crimea; Kharkiv and Chernihiv; Odessa and Mariupol; Lviv and Ivano- Frankivsk	Trade; Energy; Infrastructure and Reconstruction	National Identity; Media and Propaganda; Historical Narratives	Transportation Infrastructure; Network ASCOPE/ PMESII Analysis Methodology The Russian- Ukrainian War from a Russian perspective Communications; Energy Infrastructure; Military Bases and Installations; Border Security Infrastructure	Propaganda and Disinformation; Media Coverage
S (Structures)	Russian Government Leadership; State Institutions; Political Parties	Russian Armed Forces; Central Command; Operational Command; Military Districts; Joint Task Forces; Special Operations Forces	State Budget Structure; Domestic Economic Policy; Access to Capital Markets	Historical Narrative; National Identity; Ethnic and Linguistic Affiliation;	Transport Network; Border Infrastructure; Cyber Infrastructure; Humanitarian Infrastructure	Official Government Statements; Media Coverage

	P (Politie)	M (Military)	E (Economic)	S (Social)	I (Infrastructure)	I (Information)
C (Capabilities)	Leadership Authority; Government Institutions; Diplomatic Influence; Domestic Support and Stability	Offensive maneuvers, defensive operations, and support for separatist groups; Nuclear capabilities; Missile capabilities; Advanced cyber warfare capabilities; Electronic Warfare; Asymmetric warfare and destabilizing enemy forces; Logistical capabilities.	Energy Resources; Financial Reserves; Industrial Base; Trade Relations; Sanctions Resilience	Historical Narrative; Media Influence; Cultural Diplomacy;	Transportation Networks; Communication Systems; Energy Infrastructure; Cyber Infrastructure; Humanitarian Infrastructure	Intelligence capabilities; Information propaganda capabilities;

O (Organization)	P (Politic)	M (Military)	E (Economic)	S (Social)	I (Infrastructure)	I (Information)
	political organizations; Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; United Russia party	Russian Armed Forces; Special Operations Forces (SOF); Information Warfare Units; Proxy Forces	Ministry of Finance; Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF); Gazprom; Central Bank of Russia; Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Russian Orthodox Church (ROC); State Agency for Culture; Veterans Association; Youth Organizations; Media and Cultural Institutions; Public Opinion Research and Polling Institute	Ministry of Transport; Gazprom; Rosatom; Russian Railways (RZD); Roscosmos; Ministry of Energy; Regional and Municipal Authorities	RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik; Federal Agency for Press and Mass communications; Internet Research Agency (IRA); Spokespersons and Government Officials
P (People)	Vladimir Putin; Russian Parliament	Vladimir Putin; Sergey Shoigu; Valery Gerasimov; Alexander Dvornikov; Igor Konashenkov	Vladimir Putin; Anton Siluanov; Mikhail Mishustin; Elvira Nabiullina; Dmitry Medvedev;	Patriarch Kirill; Sergei Lavrov; Margarita Simonyan; Vladimir Soloviev	Denis Manturov; Aleksandr Kozlov; Vitaly Markelov; Igor Sechin; Dmitry Rogozin	Sergey Lavrov; Dmitry Kiselyov; Maria Zakharova

	P (Politic)	M (Military)	E (Economic)	S (Social)	I (Infrastructure)	I (Information)
E (Event)	Russian Recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk; Deployment of Russian Peacekeepers to Eastern Ukraine; Bilateral Talks and Negotiations.	Invasion of Eastern Ukraine; Siege of Mariupol; Battle of Kyiv; Occupation of Crimea; Ceasefire Negotiations	Investment Uncertainty; Impact of Sanctions; Ruble Devaluation; Diversification of Economic Partnerships	Public Demonstrations and Rallies; Cultural and Educational Exchanges; Memorialization and Commemoration; Religious and Spiritual Engagement	Military Development and Deployment; Cross-Border Infrastructure Projects; Energy Infrastructure Security; Information and Communication Networks; Transportation and Logistics; Critical Infrastructure Protection; Reconstruction and Rehabilitation	Propaganda Campaigns and Media Messaging; Disinformation Campaigns and Psychological Operations; Public Diplomacy and International Outreach; Social Media Influence Operations; Media Coverage; Diplomatic Initiatives and Peace Negotiations; Opinion Polls

Source: Data processed by the author

Table 3. ASCOPE/PMESII Analysis Methodology - the Russian-Ukrainian War from a Ukrainian perspective.

	P (Politic)	M (Military)	E (Economic)	S (Social)	I (Infrastructure)	I (Information)
A (Area)	Territorial Integrity National Sovereignty Political Stability	Eastern Ukraine; Kyiv; Southern Ukraine; Chernihiv and Sumy; Western Ukraine	Trade and Investment; Energy; Infrastructure Damage; Foreign Aid and Assistance	National Identity; Language; Religion; National Unity	Transport Infrastructure; Energy Facilities; Communication Systems; Water and Sanitation Infrastructure	Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns; Public Opinion and National Unity
S Structures	Governmental Institutions; State Institutions; Ukrainian Parliament	Armed Forces of Ukraine; Special Operations Forces (SOF); Volunteer Battalions	Trade and Investment; Government Expenditure and Budget Deficit; Inflation and Currency Devaluation	Historical Narrative; National Identity; Cultural Resilience; Social Cohesion	Transportation Network; Communication Systems; Energy Infrastructure; Water Supply; Reconstruction Efforts	Official Government Statements; Media Coverage
C (Capabilities)	International Diplomacy; Strategic Communications; Adaptability	Mobilizing conventional forces; Air and Missile Defense; Cyber Warfare; Naval Capabilities	Economic Challenges; Resilience and Adaptability; International Support	Historical Narrative and National Identity; Cultural Heritage and Language; Education System and Societal Values	Transportation Infrastructure; Energy Infrastructure; Communication Systems; Water and Sanitation Infrastructure; Health Infrastructure	Strategic Communications; Countering Disinformation; Cyber Defense and Resilience

	P (Politic)	M (Military)	E (Economic)	S (Social)	I (Infrastructure)	I (Information)
O (Organization)	Zelensky and his government; political parties; Civil society organizations and volunteer groups	Ukrainian Armed Forces; Special Operations Forces (SOF); Civil Support; International Assistance	Central Bank of Ukraine; Ministry of Finance of Ukraine; Association of Ukrainian Entrepreneurs; Ukrainian Foreign Investment Board	Maidan SOS; Helsinki Initiative-XXI; Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU); International Renaissance Foundation (IRF)	State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU); Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine; Ukrainian Railways (UZ); Naftogaz of Ukraine; National Guard of Ukraine	Ukrainian Crisis Media Center (UCMC); UKRINFORM; UHHRU
P (People)	Volodymyr Zelensky; Dmytro Kuleba; Andriy Yermak; Denys Shmyhal	Volodymyr Zelensky; Valerii Zaluzhnyi; Sergei Shaptala; Andriy Taran; Oleksandr Syrskyi	Oleksiy Markarov; Volodymyr Melnyk; Tymofiy Mylovanov; Aivaras Abromavicius	Serhiy Zhadan; Oksana Zabuzhko; Andriy Kurkov	Denis Manturov; Aleksandr Kozlov; Oleksandr Kubrakov; Volodymyr Omelyan	Volodymyr Zelensky; Mykhailo Fedorov; Oleksandr Tkachenko; Dmytro Kuleba

E (Event)	P (Politic)	M (Military)	E (Economic)	S (Social)	I (Infrastructure)	I (Information)
	Martial Law and General Mobilization; Ukraine's EU Candidate Status; Liberation of Kherson	Invasion of Eastern Ukraine; Siege of Mariupol; Battle of Kyiv; Battle of Donbas	Energy Security; Currency Fluctuations; Infrastructure Reconstruction and Investment; Sanctions and Economic Pressure on Russia	National Unity and Solidarity; Civil Society Activism; Cultural Resilience and Expression; International Solidarity	Infrastructure Damage; Reconstruction Efforts; Strategic Importance of Infrastructure; Cyberattacks on Infrastructure	Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns; International Media Coverage; Social Media and Digital Activism; Official Communications and Public Diplomacy; Digital Security and Cyber Defense

Source: Data processed by the author

Besides that, Ukraine's strategy is based on denial of objectives and imposing costs against Russia [19]. Ukraine leveraged international support, high patriotism, and asymmetric tactics to slow Russian advances and increase costs. Based on strategic theory, Russia implemented a combination of offensive and defensive strategies tailored to achieve its geopolitical goals while countering the perceived threat of Western encroachment [20]. This is in line with Cordesman's (2017) study which highlighted the important role of innovation and adaptation in modern warfare, especially for states facing a larger military power.

ASCOPE/PMESII analysis provides a useful framework for understanding the complex operational environment of this conflict. From the Russian perspective, military and political factors are most dominant, using military force to achieve political goals. From the Ukrainian perspective, social and informational factors are of paramount importance, with efforts to build public support and mobilize international opinion. Infrastructure is also an important target for both sides, given its role in supporting military operations and civilian life. This is in line with Kofman et al. [21] who emphasize the importance of understanding the social and informational dimensions

of modern warfare, and their implications for military strategy.

5.1. Implications

Theoretical Implications

Theoretically, this study contributes to the development of strategy theory and conflict studies by applying the ASCOPE/PMESII framework in analyzing the Russia-Ukraine war. This study enriches the understanding of how various factors (area, structure, capability, organization, society, and events) and dimensions (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure) interact and influence the course of the conflict. In addition, this study also strengthens the relevance of Clausewitz's theory on the relationship between politics and war in the context of modern conflict. By integrating strategy theory and the ASCOPE/PMESII framework, this study offers a more comprehensive approach to analyzing conflict and formulating effective defense strategies.

Practical Implications

Practically, this study provides valuable insights for the Indonesian Navy in facing maritime security challenges in the regional area. The results of this study can be used as learning materials and input in formulating a more adaptive and responsive defense strategy to hybrid threats. This study also highlights the importance of understanding

the operational environment and the dimensions of politics, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure in planning and implementing military operations. The recommendations resulting from this study can help the Indonesian Navy in improving its situational analysis capabilities, developing new tactics and technologies, and strengthening cooperation with strategic partners. Thus, this study contributes to improving the readiness and effectiveness of the Indonesian Navy in maintaining Indonesia's maritime security and sovereignty

6. CONCLUSIONS

This study, which focuses on a case study of the 2022-2024 Russia-Ukraine war using ASCOPE/PMESII analysis, aims to understand resource-based warfare strategies and their benefits for the Indonesian Navy. The results of the analysis show that this conflict is a complex example of modern warfare involving a combination of conventional, asymmetric, cyber, and non-military warfare. Russia's strategy initially focused on achieving political goals through the use of measured military force, while Ukraine adopted a defensive strategy that utilized international support and asymmetric tactics.

ASCOPE/PMESII analysis reveals how both parties utilized

various aspects of the operational environment (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events) as well as political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) dimensions to achieve their respective goals. Russia utilized military superiority and information capabilities, while Ukraine relied on international support, asymmetric tactics, and civil resistance.

From the perspective of Clausewitz's theory of war, this conflict asserts that war is a continuation of politics by other means, where political goals guide military strategy. Strategy theory helps understand how both parties plan, organize, and use available resources to achieve their respective goals. The application of the ASCOPE/PMESII framework provides a more comprehensive understanding of the operational environment and the factors that influence the course of the conflict.

Overall, this study provides theoretical implications in enriching the understanding of modern war strategy and conflict studies. The practical implication is to provide valuable insights for the Indonesian Navy in facing maritime security challenges in the regional area. This study highlights the importance of understanding the operational environment, adapting to changing situations, and utilizing information

technology in planning and implementing military operations. Thus, the results of this study can be used as learning materials and input in formulating a more effective and adaptive defense strategy for the Indonesian Navy.

Further research can also develop computer-based simulation models to predict the impact of various military and non-military strategies in conflict, or further explore the role of information technology and social media in influencing public opinion and conflict dynamics. Additionally, an in-depth analysis of the ethical and legal implications of the use of asymmetric tactics and cyber warfare is also a promising area for future research.

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